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Anshuman A. Mondal
‘Representing the very ethic he battled’: secularism,
Islam(ism) and self-transgression in The Satanic Verses
This essay examines the ethics of historical representation in Salman Rush-
die’s novel The Satanic Verses in order to probe his claim that the novel
explores religious belief from a secular point of view, and is undertaken
‘in good faith’. In so doing, the essay attempts to traffic between the dis-
crepant secular and Islamic readings of the novel using a contrapuntal
methodology which brings these perspectives into a productive crisis that
opens up a space for other readings of the text that do justice to both its
secular and literary dimensions, as well as the Islamic materials on which
the novel draws heavily. The essay subsequently addresses one of the
central objections articulated by the novel’s Muslim critics – that it is a
work of ‘bad history’ – in order to evaluate whether or not it was
indeed written ‘in good faith’. The reading of the novel that emerges
suggests that it is ethically problematic in this respect because its violations
of the historical record pertaining to the Prophet Muhammad and early
Islam deliver an interpretation of Islamic history that is complicit with
the very Islamist understandings that Rushdie professes to be challenging.
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Almost a year after Ayatollah Khomeini’s ‘unfunny Valentine’ propelled
him into hiding, Salman Rushdie published a defence of himself and his
novel, The Satanic Verses, entitled ‘In Good Faith’.1 In its wide-ranging dis-
cussion of the issues raised by the controversy – the respective limits of
freedom of expression and religious freedom, the role of the imagination
and the writer in speaking truth to power, and the respective value of
secular and sacred texts to name a few – this essay (and, subsequently,
the Herbert Read Memorial Lecture later published as ‘Is Nothing
Sacred?’) can be seen as a mirror which reflects those concerns back
upon the novel itself.2 It has therefore provoked much comment in the
voluminous archive of academic and journalistic responses to The
Satanic Verses and the ensuing controversy. Significantly, the essay’s
central claim – that The Satanic Verses is ‘a secular man’s reckoning with
the religious spirit’, that is written ‘in good faith’3 – has not received
the critical attention it deserves, a lack that speaks to the problematic
which I seek to address here, namely the divergence and incommensurabil-
ity of secular and non-secular interpretations of the novel.
In the polarized context of a controversy in which the very principle of
freedom of expression was perceived to be under threat, readers approach-
ing The Satanic Verses from a secular perspective – whether critical or sup-
portive of Rushdie, and with few exceptions – took as axiomatic the view
that it is entirely legitimate to subject religious discourses to criticism and
satire regardless of the manner in which it is undertaken;4 for these readers,
the question of Rushdie’s ‘good faith’ does not even arise since the ethical
confirmation of his integrity lies in the a priori validity of the novel’s speak-
ing of a (profane) truth to (sacred) power, which is one of the ways that
western secularism has historically defined itself. As such, secular perspec-
tives on the novel accept Rushdie’s claim at face value – that the novel was
self-evidently a genuine and serious critique of Islam, not a vehicle to ‘insult
and abuse’ its Prophet – precisely because the legitimacy of subjecting reli-
gious discourses and personalities to critical examination – regardless of
one’s motives or intentions – does not need to be established and therefore
defended.
On the other hand, many of those readers encountering the text (or, in
most cases, the controversy) from a non-secular point of view – principally
Muslim, but also some from other faiths – rejected Rushdie’s claim
because for them the legitimacy of secular discourse is superseded by the
primacy of the religious discourses that determine and shape their faith.
This does not, of itself, preclude the possibility of acknowledging and
even accepting criticism – many Muslim participants in the debate
argued that they did not object to criticism of Islam and its Prophet as
such, but rather the manner of it5 – but, nevertheless, from this perspective
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the ethical validity of secular criticism of religious discourses requires expla-
nation and cannot be taken for granted.
Moreover, one of the many incommensurabilities determining the
controversy was between the grounds on which secular criticism might
offer such an explanation, and those by which Muslims might have under-
stood or accepted it. In other words, part of the difficulty in translating the
controversy into a mutually productive dialogue lay in the fact that the
explanations put forward by Rushdie and his secular champions were
not acceptable – or even recognizable – as such to their Muslim interlo-
cutors because the respective axioms of moral judgment concerning ‘the
relative value of the sacred and the profane’, were divergent and irreconcil-
able.6 Therefore, Muslim (non)readers by and large rejected Rushdie’s
claim to have written the The Satanic Verses in good faith, also without
further examination.
This, then, is the problematic within which any attempt to address the
ethical validity of Rushdie’s endeavour must take its place, for that is what
is at stake in his claim to have written ‘in good faith’. In attempting to
examine whether Rushdie’s novel offers testimony to support his case,
one must situate any reading within the space vacated by these polarized
critical paradigms and attempt to traffic between them. Is it possible to
do justice to the secular impulse behind Rushdie’s reckoning with religious
faith and judge his efforts in terms of Islamic traditions of interpretation
and moral judgment, that is, in terms other than the secular imperatives
of modern literary criticism itself? This requires a methodology capable
of utilizing the critical protocols and insights of secular literary criticism
whilst simultaneously subjecting that criticism to the pressure of an oppos-
ing perspective that might, for instance, read the same text not only from a
radically different perspective, but also from very different foundational
principles – and, in so doing, also subject this other perspective to the
same pressure as well.7 This dual task, which, following Edward Said, I
shall call ‘contrapuntal criticism’, seeks not to resolve or ‘transcend’ these
divergent paradigms in some superordinate synthesis but rather to bring
both into ‘crisis’ in the name of a critical agenda that seeks to explore
the ethics (as opposed to just the politics) of a cross-cultural text.8 This
is important because The Satanic Verses – that ‘love song to our mongrel
selves’9 – breathtakingly traverses (and travesties) multiple cultural bound-
aries, transgressing the boundary between the secular and the non-secular
in particular. In that sense, it is a text that demands a contrapuntal criticism
because it is a work that brings the secular and the non-secular, the sacred
and the profane, into contact and crisis. Indeed, the validity of Rushdie’s
claim to have written in good faith rests, as I shall show, on whether or
not the novel is a genuinely contrapuntal text that effectively brings
secular and non-secular experiences into a productive me´lange or
Anshuman A. Mondal Secularism and Islam(ism) in The Satanic Verses
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‘hotch-potch’ (to use Rushdie’s own terms), which enables a secular sensi-
bility to inhabit and thereby empathize with, and understand, religious
experience, albeit imaginatively and temporarily, or whether, in fact, it sub-
ordinates the singularity of the one (religious experience) to the dominat-
ing perspective of the other (secularism).
∗∗∗
In ‘In Good Faith’ Rushdie writes,
I still believe – perhaps I must – that understanding is possible, and
can be achieved without the suppression of the principle of free
speech. What it requires is a moment of good-will; a moment in
which we may all accept that the other parties are acting, have
acted, in good faith.10
Here, Rushdie not only defends his motives, but also acknowledges the
integrity of his opponents. It is an ethical gesture in so far as it seeks to
transform a ‘bad’ situation into a ‘good’ one: the recognition of each
other’s ‘good-will’, Rushdie hopes, might transform mutual incomprehen-
sion and rancour into productive exchange and dialogue (‘understanding is
possible’).
But how is one to assess the integrity of the gesture itself? Making a
claim of this kind is not in itself a guarantee of its validity. Moreover,
the gesture is doubly charged; it is at once an attempt at reconciliation
and an avoidance of compromise – it both reaches out to the ‘other’ but
does not give any ground; instead, it seeks to set the problem to one
side. It is also both defensive and offensive (in the sense of ‘attack’). On
the one hand, it responds to the charge that his intention was simply to
‘insult and abuse’ the Prophet Muhammad and Islam. At the same time,
Rushdie challenges his Muslim opponents to live up to their claim that
Islam is not above or beyond criticism by acknowledging his novel as a
serious and genuine critique. At no point, however, does he concede the
possibility that the manner of this critique might indeed justify their
complaint.
As it stands, therefore, Rushdie’s claim remains open to (conflicting)
interpretation and rests on the vexed question of the novel’s ‘manner’ or
‘style’ in relation to Islam and its Prophet. The Satanic Verses, therefore,
offers the only testimony by which one might arbitrate between his
claim on the one hand, and those of his Muslim opponents on the
other. Whilst acknowledging that The Satanic Verses resists definitive read-
ings, the critical task I want to pursue here is an examination of the novel in
relation to one (out of several) of the Muslim charges against Rushdie, one
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that he himself responds to in ‘In Good Faith’, namely that The Satanic
Verses is a ‘work of bad history’.11
Throughout the many paratexts surrounding The Satanic Verses,
Rushdie demonstrates two particular equivocations with respect to the
relationship of his novel to history. On the one hand, he acknowledges
the proximity of his fiction to the historical record, ‘almost everything in
those sections – the dream sequences – starts from an historical or
quasi-historical basis’.12 On the other hand, he distances his novel from
history, his fiction from the – ‘partial and ambiguous’ – facts,
The section of the book in question . . . deals with a prophet who is
not called Muhammad living in a highly fantasticated city . . . this
entire sequence happens in a dream, the fictional dream of a fictional
character . . . and one who is losing his mind, at that. How much
further from history could one get?13
In ‘In Good Faith’, he clarifies his position by dwelling at length on
the relationship between ‘fiction’ and ‘fact’. Beginning with an insistence
on the ‘fictionality of fiction’ as a riposte to the allegation that The
Satanic Verses is a ‘work of bad history’,14 he then goes on to state that
I was not attempting to falsify history, but to allow a fiction to take
off from history . . . the point is not whether this is ‘really’ supposed
to be Muhammad, or whether the satanic verses incident ‘really’ hap-
pened; the point is to examine what such an incident might reveal
about what revelation is.15
As Jerome de Groot has pointed out, such concerns have been germane to
historical fiction since its inception, but Rushdie’s particular formulation
might be said to be ‘postmodern’ in so far as it self-consciously argues
that the significance of historical ‘facts’ do not emerge self-evidently, but
rather through the (fictional and non-fictional) use of that past for particu-
lar ends.16 This problematizes the very distinction between ‘fact’ and
‘fiction’ in so far as the idea of ‘facticity’ being a sufficient ground for his-
torical knowledge is called into question. Instead, facts must be ‘fashioned’
(the root of ‘fiction’, fingere, means ‘to fashion’) – whether by the historian
or the novelist – into a ‘meaning’ through formal techniques of represen-
tation that invariably involve some form of narrativization, even when that
narrativization is not outwardly apparent.17
This, however, raises ethical questions concerning the validity of using
the past for ends which are, to use Rushdie’s own words, ‘tangentially his-
torical’ by means of the deliberate tampering with its material traces for it is
accepted by both Rushdie’s critics, and by Rushdie himself, that he ‘plays’
Anshuman A. Mondal Secularism and Islam(ism) in The Satanic Verses
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with the historical record. Such questions are, however, foreclosed almost
immediately when Rushdie apparently repeats the same point on the next
page, ‘Fiction uses facts as a starting-place, and then spirals away to explore
its real concerns . . . to treat fiction as if it were fact is to make a serious
mistake of categories’.18 On closer inspection, however, this is a totally
different construction of the relationship between fact and fiction, for
instead of blurring the distinction between them it emphasizes their categ-
orical difference. This articulates a more ‘empiricist’ notion of history in
which facts are facts, and historiography and fiction occupy radically differ-
ent, even opposed, discursive terrains.
This equivocation between postmodern and empiricist registers in
relation to history accounts for the attenuated sense of responsibility he
demonstrates in relation to his writing. On the one hand, he celebrates
with Promethean enthusiasm the Romantic notion of an absolutely free
imagination, but on the other hand, as a secularist and materialist, he
recoils from the metaphysical implications implicit in such an idealist sacra-
lization of aesthetics.19 As a result, he feels compelled to exhibit some kind of
responsibility to material reality, and this he does by observing and acknowl-
edging the notion of historical facticity whilst, at the same time, minimizing
his responsibility to the ‘facts’ by placing it as merely a point of departure
from which the unrestrained imagination might take flight.
Such equivocations stand in lieu of the ethical questions that arise
when the very notion of ‘facticity’ is thrown into doubt, and Rushdie’s
occlusion of them is symptomatic of the relative paucity of ethical con-
sideration within postmodernism generally about the responsibilities
attendant upon historical representation, which stands in stark contrast
to its extensive consideration of such epistemological issues as the
grounds of historical knowledge, and the limits of representation and tex-
tuality.20 Ironically, these are considerations that are made visible in the
first place by postmodernism’s critique of historical empiricism. The
ethic of historical empiricism, which aims for totality, comprehensiveness,
objectivity, and fidelity, attenuates ethical self-awareness by reducing
‘good’ historical practice to a matter of method.21 Every stage of historical
practice – the selection and deselection of sources; the authorization or
otherwise of such sources; the indexing of ‘evidence’ according to its
‘value’; the inclusion or exclusion of evidence in the account; the formal
organization of the material in a ‘faithful’ representation; and, crucially,
the key concept of ‘empathy’ – throws up questions that are insistently
ethical but which are nevertheless trumped and flattened by methodologi-
cal concerns. The selection of a ‘good’ source, for instance, involves more
than just weighing up its reliability or trustworthiness; it also involves
asking questions about what purpose the source might serve, and for
whom; is it morally acceptable to use such a source, and if not, why not?
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To what ends might the ‘evidence’ be legitimately put? What is a ‘good’
reading of the evidence? Is it acceptable to fill in the gaps through specu-
lation – to insert one’s own voice in place of the silence? To what extent
might an educated guess suffice, and at what point should one refrain
from going further? These are all moral, as well as epistemological, ideo-
logical, or political questions.
To the extent that postmodernism has rendered the processes of his-
torical fashioning visible, it has exposed the historian and novelist to such
moral dilemmas because it invites reflection on the correct relationship,
within historical practice, between means and ends. But it has consistently
foreclosed such questions by focusing relentlessly on the epistemology and
politics of representation, but rarely, if ever, on the ethical responsibilities
attendant upon the act of historical writing. Linda Hutcheon suggests that
‘if the archive is composed of texts then it is open to all kinds of use and
abuse’, and if this is true (and I think it is) then surely one question that
arises concerns the point at which that abuse denies the very historicity
of the archive itself?22 This is a question of degree not of kind (as suggested,
for example, by the empiricist emphasis on the categorical separation of
‘fact’ from ‘fiction’): if postmodernism enables historical ‘play’ by decon-
structing the foundations of historical empiricism, to what extent can
one play with the facts before the representation becomes not a ‘historio-
graphical metafiction’, nor even a historical fiction, but merely a fantasy?
That is, how far is it possible or desirable to depart from what is ‘conven-
tionally accepted’ before the critique is negated by the extent of the dis-
tance?23 How much can the conventional archive be violated, before the
violation itself becomes the issue rather than the critical re-vision of the his-
torical record? Such questions invite us to dwell on degrees, extents, and
limits, which are all part of the vocabulary of ethical practice but are
seldom present in the lexicon of both empiricist and postmodern theoriza-
tions of historical practice.24
In The Satanic Verses, Rushdie does not always violate the conventional
historical record relating to the first years of Islam. Indeed, it may well be the
relative proximity of his account of the formation of Islam to the orthodox
sacred history that precipitated such emotional turbulence in contemporary
Muslim (non)readers. Nevertheless, there are some clear transgressions of the
orthodox narrative and some less obvious play with the available historical
evidence, and the question thus arises as to whether these uphold or under-
mine his claim to have written ‘in good faith’. Might the ambiguous position
he adopts in relation to history when defending the novel be indicative of a
profound, and barely acknowledged, discomfort about the integrity of his
(ab)use of the sacred history of Islam and its Prophet?
∗∗∗
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If we accept the argument that the historical archive is not a residuum of
data consisting of transparent ‘facts’ that in turn yield up a singular and
‘objective’ narrative about the past, that ‘facts’ are constructs that are
semantically unstable and polysemous, and these in turn deliver a multi-
plicity of possible narratives, then how might we judge the integrity of
any given historical narrative? We can no longer assume that it turns on
the question of misrepresentation, for there is no objective standard
against which to measure a writer’s (in)fidelity to a given set of facts.
In this context, Rushdie’s deviation (or otherwise) is, in itself, not the
issue. The task is not to judge Rushdie’s responsibility to his ‘evidence’, and
therefore his good faith, in terms of the extent of his departure (or other-
wise) from some putatively unproblematic and uncontested historical
‘truth’ about the life of the Prophet. Rather, the task is to ascertain and
interpret how Rushdie ‘works’ the material he draws upon, as Keith
Jenkins would put it, and to what purpose.25 To that end, there can be
few better episodes to examine than the incident which gives the novel
its title, known to Muslims as the affair of the gharaniq, or the high-
flying cranes, for it perfectly illustrates the postmodernist argument
about historical ‘facticity’ – that facts themselves, and not just the
interpretations of those facts, are contentious, not least because the fact
cannot speak for itself.
The episode of the gharaniq concerns the Prophet’s temptation by a
(satanically inspired) revelation conceding that the three principal deities
worshipped by the pagan Meccans could be accepted as divine intermedi-
aries of Allah. It occupies an interstitial space within the archive of early
Islam, part of a vast apocryphal store of narratives about the Prophet’s
sayings and conduct (hadith) that forms the basis for the Prophetic biogra-
phies (sira). Early Muslim annalists such as al-Waqidi (c. 747–823 CE),
ibn Sa’d (784–845 CE) and al-Tabari (838–923 CE) mention it in
their accounts, but it was rejected as inauthentic by the compilers of the
two canonical compendia of hadith, Bukhari (810–870 CE) and
Muslim (818–874 CE). However, the great medieval hadith scholar al-
Asqalani (1372–1448 CE) accepted its authenticity.26 It is thus a contested
fragment that stands both within and to one side of the historical record –
an indeterminacy that Rushdie exploits in his novel.
The way Rushdie works this episode is to cast doubt on the divine
origin of the Qur’anic revelation. All possible interpretations of Rushdie’s
use of this episode lead to this conclusion for we are told that ‘God isn’t in
the picture’ when the gharaniq verses are revealed.27 Thus, these verses are
either an expression of the Prophet’s innermost desire, ‘we all know how
my mouth got worked’ (p. 123); or they are a conscious political expe-
diency in order to gain some tactical advantage, ‘a dream of power’
(p. 111); or they demonstrate that the Prophet was incapable of
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distinguishing the authentic verses of Allah from the inauthentic whisper-
ings of Satan because there is no such distinction (‘both times, baba, it was
me’, (p. 123) says Gibreel, referring to the ‘authentic’ divine verses in
the extant Qur’an and the repudiated ‘satanic’ verses); in which case, as
Aravamudan argues, the logic of metonymy extends this doubt to the
entirety of the revelation (if it is not possible to authenticate this verse,
then what about the next, or any other?).28 If we extend the metonymic
logic further, then the entirety of the Qur’an can be seen as ‘satanic’
rather than ‘divine’.
But are these the only readings that such an episode might yield? The
episode is rendered by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari as follows:
[The Prophet] longed in his soul that something would come to him
from God that would reconcile him with his tribe. With his love for
his tribe and his eagerness for their welfare, it would have delighted
him if some of the difficulties which they made for him could have
been smoothed, and he debated with himself and fervently desired
such an outcome. Then God revealed (Sura 53) . . . and Satan cast
on his tongue, because of his inner debates and what he desired to
bring to his people, the words: ‘These are the high-flying cranes;
verily their intercession is to be hoped for.’29
Notice how the Prophet’s personal desire and motivation is openly
acknowledged as the basis for his temptation, and is not psychologized
in the modern sense as a displacement of some ulterior cause; nor does
it cast doubt on the authenticity of the Prophetic experience. Instead of
the incident illustrating the Prophet’s duplicity or casting doubt on the rev-
elation, the story may instead have been seen as a parable highlighting the
ethical basis of the Prophet’s temptation, i.e. to make things ‘smooth’ for
his tribe (the pagan Quraysh) because of his love for them and their
welfare (and of the early Muslims). A desire for reconciliation – and com-
promise – lies beneath the temptation, one that is undertaken for honour-
able motives according to the story, not because of devious calculation and
political expediency. What Tabari and his early Muslim readers almost cer-
tainly would not have done is deploy a modern rationality – religious or
otherwise – that invariably translates ethical and ontological issues into
epistemological ones, and the experience of faith simply into a question
of belief.
Modern Muslims find the gharaniq episode blasphemous and offen-
sive because they have, to a greater or lesser extent, absorbed
post-Enlightenment secular rationality through colonial and thence
post-colonial educational systems that have largely transformed the
ways in which they encounter their own religious traditions. As such,
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they refute the incident itself by suggesting that there are no historical
grounds for its authenticity. This counter-argument is articulated in
terms of historical empiricism, both through the insistence that The
Satanic Verses is a work of ‘bad history’, and the explicit distancing of
‘fact’ from ‘fiction’.30 In so doing, Rushdie’s modern Muslim antagonists
demonstrated a shared conceptual and discursive space with their
opponent by arguing on the grounds of in/authenticity whilst concurring
that the episode ‘works’, from both points of view, to undermine the
existence of Allah.
Regardless of the ‘authenticity’ of the episode, it is likely that Tabari,
Waqidi and other early Muslims would not have seen the same blasphe-
mous implications in the incident because they are only apparent from
the vantage point of a secularism they could not possibly have inhabited.
Rather, the early Muslims accepted that humans were tempted by shaitans,
who sensed their inner desires and exploited them, and they would have
accepted too that the Prophet would not have been exempt from such
temptations, not least because the Prophet’s temptations are alluded to
elsewhere in the Quran itself.31 Nor could they possibly have understood
the episode to be implying the non-existence of Allah. For them, the temp-
tation of the Prophet by a shaitan would simply be the unremarkable and
prima facie evidence that human affairs are subject to divine and superna-
tural power.
This example of contrapuntal analysis shows how placing divergent
readings in counterpoint can simultaneously contest Rushdie’s use of
Islamic history and the refutations of his Muslim critics, thereby bringing
the opposition itself into crisis: Rushdie and his Muslim critics are shown
to possess more common ground than they might each acknowledge. Far
from being opposed to one another, their understandings of this pivotal
episode converge whilst their rhetorical opposition is maintained by the
exclusion of other, subaltern possibilities. However, this does not furnish
sufficient evidence for an assessment of Rushdie’s ‘good faith’, not least
because, in this instance, he sticks quite closely to the recorded script –
and he can hardly be faulted for drawing the same blasphemous con-
clusions from the episode as his Muslim opponents, namely that the
episode casts doubt on the divine origin of the Qur’an.
Elsewhere in The Satanic Verses, however, he deviates quite markedly
from the conventional historical accounts of the Prophetic sira and the
social, religious and political milieu he inhabited. Take this passage from
the ‘Return to Jahilia’ section of the novel in which, ‘Gibreel appeared
to the Prophet and found himself spouting rules, rules, rules, until the
faithful could scarcely bear the prospect of any more revelation, Salman
said, rules about every damn thing’ (pp. 363–4). This is the satirical
climax of the novel, the point at which its critique is most sharply
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focused. It operates through a mode of comic exaggeration, and deliberate,
highly provocative violation of the historical record precisely in order to
signal, as obtrusively as possible, its violations. The passage, which in its
totality is a long one (pp. 363–8), proceeds to enumerate a long series
of prohibitions, a couple of which are genuine, but most of which are com-
pletely fabricated, bizarre and absurd, the excessiveness of such legislation
– signalling a totalitarian view of life – mimicked by narrative excess.
Muslim critics – and a few secular Muslims, such as Talal Asad –
have pointed out the numerous errors in detail in this long passage,
which is, in fact, far more radically blasphemous in the conventional
sense than the title incident which it reprises; for this is the passage in
which Salman inserts his own little ‘errors’ into the Qur’anic text, and
the implication that the extant text is not the literal word of Allah but
rather a human corruption is much more apparent.32 However, my interest
here is in the way the satire initially proceeds from a secular rather than
theological basis; or, rather, in how the theological doubt that it eventually
articulates emerges out of a critique of the allegedly excessive legalism of
Islam/Submission. The semantic development as well as the chronological
progression of the passage moves from Salman’s doubts about ‘rules’ to his
eventual tampering with the Qur’anic verses. At first, Salman ‘began to
notice how useful and well-timed the angel’s revelations tended to be . . .
All those revelations of convenience’ (pp. 364–5). En passant, he notes
with distaste the new rules on marriage and rehearses a long list of other
‘rules’ showing how women are kept subservient in the new religion of
Submission/Islam. But the passage ends with a theological rather than
legal critique: ‘if my poor words could not be distinguished from the Rev-
elation by God’s own messenger, then what did that mean?’ (p. 367).
It seems, therefore, that Salman’s theological doubts are consequent
upon a more primary concern with Islam/Submission’s secular presence:
its political and legal aspects. Rushdie’s critique here rests on his apprehen-
sion of, and distaste for, what he sees as Islam’s excessive and stultifying
legalism, which leaves ‘no aspect of human experience . . . unregulated,
free’ (p. 364). This is the basis of what he takes to be the totalitarianism
of contemporary Muslim societies. Ironically, however, he shares this
view of Islam – albeit from a totally different perspective – with the Isla-
mists whom he attacks, for Islamism has, since its inception in 1920s
Egypt, been little concerned with theology and more concerned with
Islam’s secular dimensions: the state and the law.33
This is not necessarily a problem. In order to attack something, in
order to satirize it, one must share the same terms of reference as the
target, and the architecture of the novel, with its narrative about the
Imam (Khomeini), clearly signals that modern Islamism – or ‘fundament-
alism’ as it was then known – is one of Rushdie’s principal concerns. The
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problem, however, arises in the way that the passage suggests that Islamic
legalism is directly derived from the Qur’anic revelation, or, to put it more
accurately, that the revelation is itself excessively and fundamentally lega-
listic, full of ‘endlessly proliferating rules’ (p. 365). This is an abuse of
the historical past in so far as it conflates both theological and secular cri-
tiques, thereby widening the scope of the attack to encompass both Islam
and Islamism, and, in fact, renders any possible distinction between the
two impossible through an essentializing gesture which contends that
Islam, at its moment of origin, is in fact inherently Islamist.
In fact, there are relatively few legal verses in the Qur’an. Of the 6000
or so verses, only about 500 have legal content, and ‘these prescriptions
cover a limited range of human affairs’.34 According to Montgomery
Watt, during his time in Medina, the Prophet instituted extensive legal
reforms only with respect to ‘social security, marriage and inheritance’.35
In presenting it otherwise, Rushdie seems to be making three distinct slip-
pages in the ‘rules, rules, rules’ passage. The first is between ahadith and
revelation. The former are reports about the Prophet’s pronouncements,
actions, behaviours, likes and dislikes, responses to certain situations and
so on. These constitute an extensive collection of anecdotes that cover a
wide range of social experience. This is clearly what Rushdie has in
mind when characterizing the comprehensiveness of Islamic legalism, for
the hadith became a principal source for Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and
what is now known as the Shari‘ah.36 However, Islamic jurisprudence
only began ‘towards the end of the Ummayad period’, that is, some 200
or so years after the death of the Prophet.37 In other words, the sunna or
example of the Prophet, as recorded in the hadith, did not become codified
as law in any legal sense until well after the formative period of Islam.
Rushdie therefore not only misrepresents the origin of the Shari‘ah in rev-
elation, but also anachronistically posits it as having been operational
during the Prophet’s lifetime.
This is the basis for the second slippage, between two different kinds
of normativity. Rushdie ascribes a normative law to a period when Islamic
normativity must have been primarily based on the ‘emulation’ of the
Prophet himself rather than ‘rules’ derived from the revelation and the
sunna, which speaks to the relative lack of ‘rules’ (in the legalistic sense)
in the Qur’an itself. As Salman Sayyid has put it, ‘the message is manifested
in the actions of the messenger. In other words, the Prophet reveals what
Islam is, but Islam is also what the Prophet does’.38 Moreover, the norma-
tivity that arises from emulation is qualitatively different to that produced
by law. An ideal to be emulated is not the same as a law that cannot be
transgressed. It is clear, for example, that the Muslims during the Prophet’s
lifetime, did not feel compelled to reproduce, in every detail, the example
of the Prophet – and nor have Muslims since.39
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The third slippage in this passage is between Islamic law and ‘divine
law’. The Shari‘ah is ‘largely man-made, based on exegesis, interpretations,
analogies, and extensive borrowing from customary practices . . . and exist-
ing local Middle Eastern legal traditions’.40 The suggestion that there are
‘rules about every damn thing’ (p. 363) has its corollary in the idea that
‘the shari‘a . . . is the revealed law of God and is, therefore, the perfect
set of rules for human conduct, which needs no supplementation by
man-made laws’.41 These ideas form the basis of Ayatollah Khomeini’s
notion of rule by jurist, vilayat-e-faqih, which, in both Rushdie’s fiction
and in life, articulates the very antithesis of hybridity. Rushdie is therefore
complicit in the ideological framing of Shari‘ah as ‘divine law’ by Muslim
orthodoxy and Islamists, in particular, although the notion has common
currency amongst Muslims and non-Muslims – which explains why
most modern Muslim critics did not pick Rushdie up on this point in
their readings of this passage; to have done so would have thrown the hege-
monic characterization of Islamic law as ‘divine’ into crisis.
What I am arguing here is that Rushdie’s historical violations involve
a series of essentializing gestures which suggest that the Islamic religion, at
the moment of its origin, instituted the kind of totalitarian Islamic state
envisaged by contemporary Islamists and embodied in the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran. The text’s architecture, which involves a series of intricate par-
allelisms that connect the various narratives, also buttresses the essentialism
most forcefully articulated in the ‘rules, rules, rules’ passage. For instance, it
is clear that the city of Jahilia is a narrative double of both Mecca and
Tehran, the description of the latter – ‘a mountain looming over a city’
(p. 206) – invoking the former, which is overlooked by Mount Hira/
Cone. This link between seventh-century Mecca and late twentieth-
century Tehran is reinforced in the passages suggesting that Mahound’s/
Muhammad’s institution of Submission/Islam in Jahilia/Mecca is main-
tained by the coercive apparatuses of a totalitarian state, in particular a
secret police and network of informers reminiscent of the Shah’s
SAVAK organization. However, as Watt reminds us, the early Islamic
social structure was not ‘an impersonal state’ and the Prophet ‘had no
police force. The very idea of such a thing was probably unknown
among the Arabs’.42 Furthermore, whilst the available historical evidence
suggests that the dwellings of seventh-century Mecca were ‘extremely
primitive’,43 the novel’s contrary representation of Jahilia as a sophisticated
and bacchanalial metropolis (pp. 103, 116), full of ‘piazza(s)’ (p. 117) and
‘enormous palazzo(s)’ (p. 376) invites comparison with a putatively
wealthy, westernized, and decadent Tehran prior to the 1979 Revolution,
‘in which the riots of the starving were brutally put down by Hind’s per-
sonal police force’ (p. 361). Similarly, post-Mahound, the city’s ‘newly
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puritanical streets’ (p. 377) reflect the post-revolutionary moralism of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Such essentializing gestures erase 1400 years of Islamic history, and
undermine the claim Rushdie makes in ‘In Good Faith’ that The Satanic
Verses attacks ‘the narrower definitions of Islam’ as opposed to Islam as a
whole.44 Indeed, throughout that essay, he displays an insistent urge to dis-
tinguish between some Muslims and forms of Islam, and the wider general-
ity of Muslims and Islam itself, with whom he says he has no quarrel.45 In
so doing, he hopes to demonstrate that he sees a distinction between Islam
as a historical phenomenon in all its diversity and development, and what
he sees as the attempt by certain Muslims to place it outside of history, to
eternalize it by ‘fixing’ it forever.46 However, there is a discrepancy between
this later claim that the novel defends ‘historical’ Islam from the ‘funda-
mentalists’ and the textual evidence furnished by the novel itself. The
space opened up by this discrepancy illuminates the unwitting complicity
between Rushdie and the Islamists he is apparently attacking, for their
respective essentializations rest on a mutual foreclosure (despite Rushdie’s
apparent endorsement of them) of the heterodox and subaltern possibilities
that exist, and have existed, within the scriptural and apocryphal traditions
of ‘historical’ Islam.
Furthermore, it is actually very difficult to pin down the particular
Muslims or ‘narrower’ forms of Islam he has in mind: certainly, Khomeini
and the Islamism of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and ‘fundamentalists’
more generally; but he also arraigns ‘Muslim leaders’, and ‘orthodoxy’,
and even organized religion of any kind. The very expansiveness of this
target, the way it shifts throughout his discourse, its very instability, in
fact collapses the distinction he so assiduously tries to maintain between
the general and the particular, for it is almost impossible to imagine how
anyone could be a Muslim at all without some kind of orthodoxy, or
some form of institutionalized practice. In fact, it becomes very difficult
to imagine an Islam that Rushdie might approve of; the standard response
amongst critics is to suggest Sufism, but it would have to be a de-institu-
tionalized Sufism shorn of its tariqas, its rigid hierarchies and spiritual dis-
ciplines.47 Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the only kind
of Muslim Rushdie really does not have a problem with is the kind that sees
his or her faith in purely secularized terms as a private, individualized spiri-
tuality. Despite asserting that his novel dissents against ‘imposed ortho-
doxies of all types’, Rushdie therefore imposes an orthodoxy himself,
namely secular-liberalism and its version of permissible religiosity.48
However, this orthodoxy – shall we call it ‘secular fundamentalism’? –
remains invisible to him because it constitutes the ideological ground on
which he stands.49
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The unacknowledged essentialization of Islam, the complicity with
Islamism, the inability to see, let alone dissent from, secularist orthodoxy
with respect to religious belief and practice: all of these represent the linea-
ments of Rushdie’s ethical failure in The Satanic Verses, at least with respect
to this particular aspect of the novel. And there is one further ethical failure
to note, one that, in some respects, stands above the others. Each of the
failures suggested above constitutes a self-transgression in so far as The
Satanic Verses and its author self-consciously set themselves against essenti-
alism (the Untime of the Imam), against Islamism, and against ‘ortho-
doxies of all types’. In each instance, however, the novel not only
replicates and reinforces that which it opposes, but it does so without
self-knowledge. As a result, its politics is hopelessly compromised (with dis-
astrous results). Some Muslims accused Rushdie of cultural betrayal, but in
fact his greatest betrayal was of himself.
Linda Hutcheon argues that postmodernism’s politics is invariably
compromised because its mode is ‘complicitous critique’, which ‘install[s]
and reinforce[s] as much as undermine[s] and subvert[s] the conventions
and presuppositions it appears to challenge’.50 If that is the case,
however, such a politics, if it is to be at all effective – and if it is to have
any integrity – must be absolutely scrupulous about its modality, about
the means of its critique as well as its ends. As I have shown, such scrupu-
lousness is not evident in The Satanic Verses, or any of its subsequent non-
fictional paratexts. It is therefore ironic that Salman (the Persian/Rushdie)
should argue that the Prophet (Mahound/Muhammad), ‘had no time for
scruples . . . no qualms about ends and means’ (p. 363) because the same
could be said of him.
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